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REAL PERSONS, CORPORATE PERSONS
AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY*
Courts have consistently held that a corporate officer cannot be vicariously liable
for the torts of a subordinate employee. However, a recent Ohio Court of Appeals
decision, which purports to follow this tradition, adopts a standard allowing an officer
of a corporation to be held liable for the negligent tort of another corporate employee
if he "personally knew or personally should know" of a risk of harm. This Note ar-
gues that the failure of the Ohio court to describe the behavior necessary to find that
an officer "personally should know, "permits the officer to be held vicariously liable.
The author analyzes whether the theories which support vicarious liability of corpora-
tions apply equally well to individual officers, and, concluding that in most cases they
do not, suggests an alternative to the recently adopted standard
WHEN AN injury results from the negligence of a corporate em-
ployee, the doctrine of respondeat superior permits the injured
party to seek compensation from the negligent employee's corporate
employer.' Consequently, suits against individual corporate officers
usually arise only when the injured party anticipates that a suit
against a corporation will result in either no relief or incomplete
relief. The injured third party may anticipate this result in several
distinct situations: 1) the corporation is insolvent or thinly capital-
ized;2 2) the corporation was liquidated between the time of the
accident and the time of the claim;3 3) the injured party is a corpo-
rate employee in a state where the worker's compensation statute
* I am grateful for the useful comments and editorial assistance of Richard A. Booth,
Professor Mollie A. Murphy and the editors and staff of the Case Western Reserve University
Law Review.
1. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. It is not neces-
sary for a business enterprise to be organized as a corporation in order to be subject to vicari-
ous liability. Similarly, it is not necessary that the tortfeasor be a corporate employee.
Vicarious liability extends to all forms of business enterprise and to the negligent acts of any
of their employees or agents. The question addressed in this Note is whether it should also be
extended to confer liability on individual supervisors of these negligent employees or agents.
2. "Insolvent" and "thinly capitalized" are used here merely in the sense that the
plaintiff anticipates that the corporation's net assets will be insufficient to satisfy the judgment
sought. See, eg., Schaefer v. D & J Produce, 62 Ohio App. 2d 53, 403 N.E.2d 1015 (1978);
Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
3. "Liquidation" as used here means the complete cessation of the corporation's exist-
ence. See, eg., Schaefer v. DeChant, 11 Ohio App. 3d 281, 464 N.E.2d 583 (1983) (corporate
directors sued after they voted for a dissolution of the corporation without first satisfying the
corporation's known obligations; court held that under the Ohio statute directors could only
be liable to the corporation and that no direct cause of action existed in a creditor). Some
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action in a creditor. See generally 12 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5432, 5434 (perm. ed. 1986).
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provides that the worker's compensation benefits shall be the sole
remedy from the corporation;4 4) the corporation is a municipality
or other governmental entity immune to the contemplated suit;5 or
5) the statute of limitations against the corporation has run.6
However, in spite of the fact that an injured third party may be
unable to recover from the corporation, courts have consistently
held that a corporate officer cannot be vicariously liable for the torts
of a subordinate employee.7 A recent Ohio Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Schaefer v. D & J Produce, Inc.,8 purports to follow this rule,
but misapplies it, and in so doing, opens the door to vicarious liabil-
ity of corporate officers. 9 The rule as interpreted by the Schaefer
court has since been adopted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska,
and seems poised for further proliferation.' 0
Part I of this Note describes the Schaefer case, traces the origins
of the standard adopted by the Schaefer court, and analyzes the
cases in which the standard was applied prior to its adoption in
Ohio. Part II analyzes the Schaefer case and its progeny, and con-
cludes that imposition of liability because an officer "should have
known" of a risk of harm is really imposition of vicarious liability.
Part III reviews the policies which support vicarious liability of cor-
porations, and concludes that these policies would not be served by
holding corporate officers vicariously liable. Part IV reviews and
4. See, e.g., Saucier v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 280 So. 2d 584 (La. Ct.
App. 1973); Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So. 2d 627 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Adams v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. Ct. App. 1958). For a full discussion of coemployee
liability, see Case Comment, The Exclusive Remedy and Corporate Liability in Workers'
Compensation: O'Brian v. Grumman, 14 GA. L. REV. 368 (1980); Comment, Workers' Com-
pensation-Executive Officer Liability, 33 LA. L. REV. 325 (1973); Casenote, Workers' Com-
pensation Law-Coemployee Liability-Injured Employees May Not Recover From
Supervisors Absent the Breach of a Personal Duty of Care: Athas v. Hill, 15 U. BALT. L. REv.
158 (1985).
5. At common law territorial subdivisions performing governmental as opposed to pro-
prietary functions could not be held liable in tort actions. This immunity has been eroded but
continues in force in many jurisdictions. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 131.
See also Bowes v. Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, 12 Ohio App. 3d 12, 465 N.E.2d 904
(1983) (municipal corporation held not immune to suit).
6. See, e.g., Dieter v. Hand, 214 Neb. 257, 333 N.W.2d 772 (1983) (individual officers
sued when statute of limitations against the public power district pursuant to NEB. REv.
STAT. § 23-2401-2420 (1983) had run).
7. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 860 & nn.8-9 ("With few exceptions... private victims can obtain judgments
against a manager only for his personal conduct .... "). See also Annotation, Personal Civil
Liability of Officer or Director of Corporation for Negligence of Subordinate Corporate Em-
ployee Causing Personal Injury or Death of Third Person, 90 A.L.R.3D 916 (1976).
8. 62 Ohio App. 2d 53, 403 N.E.2d 1015 (1978).
9. See infra Part II.
10. Dieter v. Hand, 214 Neb. 257, 333 N.W.2d 772 (1983). See infra Part II B.
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distinguishes recent scholarship arguing that individual corporate
participants (officers, supervisors, directors, etc.) should be held lia-
ble for the acts of others. Finally, Part V proposes two alternatives
to the new standard advanced by the Ohio Court.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SCHAEFER STANDARD
A. The Schaefer Case
On July 15, 1973, a truck owned by D & J Produce Inc. and
driven by James Beese, a corporate employee, ran a stop sign and
collided with a vehicle driven by Raymond Schaefer." Schaefer
died from injuries sustained in the accident.12 The record contained
allegations that prior to the accident Beese knew that the truck had
a defective braking system, no operative hand brake, and no opera-
tive horn.1 3 Based on this textbook set of respondeat superior facts,
Schaefer's widow sued James Beese and D & J Produce. 4 In addi-
tion, the complaint named as defendants two officers of D & J Pro-
duce on the theory that they dispatched Beese, and that they knew
or should have known of the condition of the truck. 5 The trial
court granted the motions to dismiss the two officers, but the appel-
late court, adopting a new standard for officer liability, reversed.16
The standard adopted by the Schaefer court imposes liability on
a corporate officer if the following conditions are met:
"l) The principal or employer owes a duty of care to the third
person (which in this [instance] includes a co-employee), breach
of which has caused the damage for which recovery is sought. 2)
This duty is delegated by the principal or employer to the de-
fendant. 3) The defendant officer, agent, or employee has
breached this duty through personal (as contrasted with techni-
cal or vicarious) fault. The breach occurs when the defendant
has failed to discharge the obligation with the degree of care re-
quired by ordinary prudence under the same or similar circum-
stances-whether such failure be due to malfeasance,
misfeasance, or nonfeasance, including when the failure results
from not acting upon actual knowledge of the risk to others as
well as from a lack of ordinary care in discovering and avoiding
such risk of harm which has resulted from the breach of the
11. Schaefer, 62 Ohio App. 2d at 54, 403 N.E.2d at 1017.
12. Id. at 54, 403 N.E.2d at 1016-17.
13. Id. at 54, 403 N.E.2d at 1017.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 60-62, 403 N.E.2d at 1020-21. Prior to Schaefer, Ohio courts drew distinc-
tions between misfeasance aqd nonfeasance. See id. at 58-60, 403 N.E.2d at 1019-1020. See
also infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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duty. 4) With regard to the personal (as contrasted with techni-
cal or vicarious) fault, personal liability cannot be imposed upon
the officer, agent or employee simply because of his general ad-
ministrative responsibility for performance of some function of
the employment. He must have a personal duty toward the in-
jured plaintiff, breach of which specifically has caused the plain-
tiff's damages. If the defendant's general responsibility has been
delegated with due care to some responsible subordinate or sub-
ordinates, he is not himself personally at fault and liable for the
negligent performance of this responsibility unless he personally
knows or personally should know of its non-performance or mal-
performance and has nevertheless failed to cure the risk of
harm."
1 7
Although the rule explicitly states that officers cannot be held vicar-
iously liable, it also imposes liability on an officer who "personally
should know" of a risk of harm. Yet, if a court relies solely on an
individual's position with the company to find that he "personally
should know," the court is effectively holding the officer vicariously
liable.'"
B. The Louisiana Origins
To understand the significance of the action taken by the Schae-
fer court, we must consider the limits of the standard that were
contemplated by the court in which the rule was formulated. The
Schaefer court adopted verbatim a standard first enunciated by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1973, in Canter v. Koehring Co. 19
Koehring Company manufactured a crane which was sold to
Furlow-Laughlin, who in turn leased it to Industrial Construction
Co. (ICC).20 ICC entered into a contract with Pittsburgh Plate
Glass (PPG) to construct a chemical plant. 1 One of ICC's employ-
ees was killed when the crane, rigged in a manner that caused it to
be overloaded, collapsed on him.22 Among the parties sued by the
victim's widow were five PPG engineers.23 The jury found four of
17. Schaefer, 62 Ohio App.2d at 60-61, 403 N.E.2d at 1020-21 (quoting Canter v. Koeh-
ring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 721 (La. 1973)) (emphasis added).
18. See infra Part II.
19. 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973). For the legislative response to this decision, see infra
note 62.
20. The facts of this case have been drawn from the appellate court opinion: Canter v.
Koehring Co., 267 So. 2d 270, 271 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Prior to 1976, the Louisiana worker's compensation statute provided that
worker's compensation was an injured employee's sole remedy against his corporation, but
the statute did not restrict suits against fellow employees. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032
(West 1985).
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the five engineers negligent;24 the appellate court reversed;2" and the
Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in
the Louisiana circuits over the standard to be applied in cases of
alleged corporate officer negligence.26
Two separate issues were in dispute in the Louisiana circuits.
The first issue was if a corporate officer had a duty which arose
because he was an employee or agent of his corporate employer,
could breach of that duty give rise to a cause of action in anyone
other than the corporate employer?27 In other words, could an in-
jured party sue a corporate officer because the officer breached a
duty that reposed in the officer due to his corporate position? The
court held that while an officer's position alone could not make him
liable, neither could his position absolve him of the duties which
any individual owes to any other. Specifically, the court stated "the
breach of the duty imposed by the employment or agency relation-
ship may, under general tort principles, be actionable negligence be-
cause of the creation or maintenance thereby of an undue risk of
harm to others."28
The second issue was whether an officer's breach must rise to
the level of misfeasance or malfeasance, as opposed to nonfeasance,
in order to be actionable. The court held nonfeasance could consti-
tute an actionable breach as readily as misfeasance or malfea-
sance.29  The court embodied these holdings in the four part
standard subsequently adopted by the Ohio court in Schaefer, and
reinstated the jury verdict holding four of the five defendant engi-
neers negligent." In formulating this standard and arriving at its
holding, the court relied heavily on a 1958 Louisiana appeals court
case, Adams v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York.3' In Adams
a corporate employee died from injuries he sustained when he was
struck by an iron reel which fell from a stack of steel in his em-
24. 267 So. 2d at 271.
25. Id. at 270. The appellate court found that the defendants owed no duty to the plain-
tiff and also found that the defendants did not have supervisory control over the method used
to rig the crane.
26. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 718 (La. 1973).
27. Id. at 718-19.
28. Id. at 722.
29. Id. For a full discussion of this distinction, see Seavy, Liability of an Agent in Tort, 1
S. L.Q. 16 (1916) (arguing that once an individual becomes an agent, liability should be
imposed for negligently failing to act-nonfeasance-as well as for negligently acting-
misfeasance).
30. 283 So. 2d at 727.
31. 107 So. 2d 496 (La. Ct. App. 1958).
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ployer's work yard.3 2 Consistent with the Louisiana worker's com-
pensation statute, the employee's widow sued five officers of the
employer corporation. 33 The court held that a cause of action ex-
isted against three of the officers who allegedly passed by the stack
on which the reel was placed and "[saw] or should have seen the
reel which had been negligently placed on the stack of steel in a
dangerous and perilous position."' 34 The court found the allegations
against the other two officers (Colley and Stoneman) unfounded,
holding:
We fail to see wherein plaintiffs have stated a cause of action
against Colley merely because he had under his control as super-
intendent of trucks the vehicle which hauled the iron reel to the
yard and from which it was placed on the stack of steel, not by
Colley or in his presence, for there is no such allegation of fact
.... The allegations of plaintiff's petition against the defendant
... Stoneman failed to state any cause of action as the petition
merely charges that he was president and general manager over
all the operations of the corporation and that in such capacity it
was his duty to know that Colley, his superintendent, had been
instructed to have the reel placed on the high stack of steel and
to know that the reel had been placed there with one of the vehi-
cles of his corporation by Colley where it remained in a danger-
ous and perilous position for several months.35
In other words, the Adams court clearly held that an officer who
could not have known of a risk of harm should not be held liable.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Canter made the same distinc-
tion as the Adams court between those officers to be held liable and
those to be absolved. The four officers held liable in Canter were all
aware of the weight limits of the crane and knew or could have seen
that excess weight had been added to it.36 Concerning the officer
absolved in Canter the court stated: "Spalding, who had general
supervision over the 12-15 contractors at the plant, is not shown to
have had day to day knowledge of the operat[ions] .. .
Viewed in the context of its antecedents, there can be no doubt
that the rule enunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Canter
was not intended to impose liability on an officer whose normal rou-
tine would not have enabled him to perceive a risk of harm. It is
also clear that the court did not consider the mere fact that an of-
32. Id. at 506-07.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 507-08.
35. Id.
36. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 726-27 (La. 1973).
37. Id. at 727.
[Vol. 38:453
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
ficer held a supervisory position to be evidence that his normal rou-
tine would have enabled him to perceive a risk of harm.
Unfortunately, although the holdings in Adams and Canter indi-
cate a clear understanding of where the line between liability and
non-liability is to be drawn, the language of the standard itself is far
from clear. This problem was recognized immediately by a dissent-
ing judge in Canter who presaged a future of confusion: "The vague
and indefinite formula the majority attempts to articulate for the
solution of these suits against coemployees can only lead to confu-
sion and harsh injustices to coemployees in the future."3
C. Application of Canter in Louisiana
Since it was first articulated and applied in 1973, the Canter rule
has been applied in numerous cases in Louisiana.39 The inconsis-
tencies in holdings and the pattern of dissents in these cases indicate
38. Id. at 728.
39. The Canter standard has been applied forty-one times in Louisiana: Esco v. Smith,
468 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1985); Brown v. White, 430 So. 2d 16 (La. 1982); Lytell v. Hushfield,
408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982); Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1979); H.B.
"Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975); LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216
(La. 1974); Fontenot v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 283 So. 2d 733 (La. 1973); Miller v. Upjohn
Co., 465 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App.), cert denied, 467 So. 2d 533 (La. 1985); Duvio v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co., 452 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Scariano Bros. v. Hammond Constr.,
428 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1983); White v. C.F. Indus., 411 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
Molenaar v. McGill Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Ryals v. Home Ins. Co.,
410 So. 2d 827 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Joseph v. Albarado, 407 So. 2d 1277 (La. Ct. App. 1981);
Williams v. Homco Int'l, Inc., 402 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Batiste v. Robillard, 401
So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Raley v. Carter, 401 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 412 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1982); Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 682
(La. Ct. App. 1981); Canzoneri v. Smith, 381 So. 2d 973 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Barcelona v.
Highway Express Inc., 372 So. 2d 612 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Nine v. Harper, 371 So. 2d 320
(La. Ct. App. 1979); Freeman v. Bell, 366 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cerL denied, 369
So. 2d 151 (La. 1979); Greene v. Wright, 365 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Green v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La.
1978); Miller v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1353 (La. Ct. App.), cerL denied,
352 So. 2d 235 (La. 1977); Armentor v. Fred C. Benton Indus. Repairs, 349 So. 2d 367 (La.
Ct. App.), cerL denied, 351 So. 2d 178 (La. 1977); Willis v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 So. 2d
158 (La. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 352 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1977); Allen v. John F. Beasley Constr.
Co., 347 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Lewis v. Pailet, 349 So. 2d 338 (La. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1977); Cain v. Witco Chem. Corp., 341 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct.
App. 1976); Downey v. Callery, 338 So. 2d 937 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
955 (1977); Hornsby v. Ray, 327 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 293 (La.
1976); Alexander v. Gottwald, 325 So. 2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Cagle v. Spade Drilling
Co., 325 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Coco v. Winston Indus., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. Ct.
App. 1975), rey'don other grounds, 341 So. 2d 332 (La. 1976); Cacibauda v. Gaiennie, 305 So.
2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Lyle v. National Surety Corp., 304 So. 2d 743 (La. Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 298 (1975); Hadrick v. Diaz, 302 So. 2d 345 (La. Ct. App. 1974);
Simmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Abshire v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Fabre v. Travelers Ins.
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that the Louisiana courts have not reached a consensus on the man-
ner in which the rule is to be applied.
In approximately two-thirds of the Louisiana cases applying the
Canter rule, officers were held not liable,' while in the remainder,
officers were either held liable41 or prior dismissals in their favor
were reversed.42 Despite the clear distinction drawn in Canter and
the cases on which it was based between officers who knew of a risk
of harm and officers who did not, the decisions in the later Louisi-
ana cases do not consistently turn on this point. Thus, in some
cases officers have been held not liable despite their actual knowl-
edge of a risk of harm,4 3 while in others, officers with no knowledge
Co., 286 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1973). For a disposition of these cases, see infra notes 40-
52 and accompanying text.
40. Officers were held not liable in twenty-four of the forty-one cases cited in note 39.
These twenty-four are: H.B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975);
LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974); Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 533 (La. 1985); Duvio v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 So. 2d
182 (La. Ct. App. 1984); White v. C.F. Indus., 411 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Molenaar
v. McGill Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Ryals v. Home Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d
827 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Williams v. Homco Int'l, Inc., 402 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1981);
Batiste v. Robillard, 401 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Canzoneri v. Smith, 381 So. 2d 973
(La. Ct. App. 1980); Barcelona v. Highway Express Inc., 372 So. 2d 612 (La. Ct. App. 1979);
Miller v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1353 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 352 So.
2d 235 (La. 1977); Armentor v. Fred C. Benton Indus. Repairs, 349 So. 2d 367 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 178 (La. 1977); Lewis v. Pailet, 349 So. 2d 338 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1977); Willis v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1977); Allen v. John F. Beasley Const. Co., 347 So.
2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Downey v. Callery, 338 So. 2d 937 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977); Hornsby v. Ray, 327 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 330
So. 2d 293 (La. 1976); Alexander v. Gottwald, 325 So. 2d 713 (La:. Ct. App. 1976); Cagle v.
Spade Drilling Co., 325 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Lyle v. National Surety Corp., 304
So. 2d 743 (La. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975); Hadrick v. Diaz, 302 So. 2d
345 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Abshire v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 545
(La. Ct. App. 1974); Fabre v. Travelers Ins. Co., 286 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
41. In thirteen cases officers were held liable: Esco v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1985);
Brown v. White, 430 So. 2d 16 (La. 1982); Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982);
Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1979); Joseph v. Albarado, 407 So. 2d 1277
(La. Ct. App. 1981); Raley v. Carter, 401 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 412 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1982); Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 682 (La. Ct.
App. 1981); Freeman v. Bell, 366 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 151
(La. 1979); Greene v. Wright, 365 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Cain v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 341 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Coco v. Winston Indus., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. Ct.
App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 332 (La. 1976); Cacibauda v. Gaiennie, 305 So.
2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Simmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App.
1974).
42. In four cases an officer's prior dismissal was reversed: Fontenot v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 283 So. 2d 733 (La. 1973); Scariano Bros. v. Hammond Constr., 428 So. 2d 564 (La.
Ct. App. 1983); Nine v. Harper, 371 So. 2d 320 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Green v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978).
43. In five cases, officers with actual knowledge of a risk of harm were held not liable:
[Vol. 38:453
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of a risk of harm have been held liable or subject to liability.'
A further indication of the divergence of views regarding the
proper interpretation of the Canter rule is the profusion of dissents
which accompanies these decisions. In four cases in which officers
were found not liable because they had no prior knowledge of a risk
of harm, dissents were filed arguing that the tests for liability under
Canter had been met.4 5 The dissents in two other cases in which
officers were held liable are particularly notable. In Pisciotta v. All-
state Insurance Co.,46 a Sear's employee was injured when a ceiling
panel being installed during a renovation fell on her.47 The court
premised the liability of three corporate officers on the fact that they
had visited the renovation site while the renovation was in pro-
gress.48 The dissent argued, "there was no proof in the record that
[the defendant executives] either knew or would have been aware of
the purported danger. . . ."' In Simmons v. Travelers Insurance
Co., ° an ironworker was knocked from a scaffold when the bolts on
a steel plate being lifted by a crane gave way.51 The court con-
firmed a jury verdict holding a corporate vice-president liable for
the employee's injuries. The dissent argued that the defendant of-
ficer "had not been on the jobsite for several weeks prior to the
Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 533 (La. 1985);
Miller v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1353 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 352 So.
2d 235 (La. 1977); Willis v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
352 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1977); Downey v. Callery, 338 So. 2d 937 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977). See also Pfister v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 362
(La. Ct. App. 1974) (Canter cited in dissenting opinion).
44. In five cases, officers with no prior knowledge of a risk of harm were held liable:
Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1979); Joseph v. Albarado, 407 So. 2d 1277
(La. Ct. App. 1981); Cain v. Witco Chem. Corp., 341 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Coco
v. Winston Indus., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 332
(La. 1977); Simmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1974). In four cases,
dismissals of officers with no prior knowledge of a risk of harm were reversed: Fontenot v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 283 So. 2d 733 (La. 1973); Scariano Bros. v. Hammond Constr.,
428 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Nine v. Harper, 371 So. 2d 320 (La. Ct. App. 1979);
Green v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d
210 (La. 1978).
45. Lewis v. Pailet, 349 So. 2d 338 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1213 (La.
1977); Hornsby v. Ray, 327 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 293 (La. 1976);
Lyle v. National Surety Corp., 304 So. 2d 743 (La. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898
(1975); Abshire v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App.
1974).
46. 385 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1979).
47. Id. at 1178-79.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1183.
50. 295 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
51. Id. at 553-54.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
accident [and] did not have personal responsibility for the details of
the work."52
The inconsistencies in these cases demonstrate that in spite of
the clear distinction drawn in Canter and its antecedents, the Loui-
siana courts diverge in their understanding of the extent of prior
knowledge necessary to a finding of officer liability under Canter.
D. Adoption of Canter Outside Louisiana
With the exception of the Schaefer court, and one court follow-
ing Schaefer, 3 the courts of other jurisdictions adopting the Canter
rule have avoided the confusion of the Canter language, and have
drawn the line between liability and non-liability in a manner con-
sistent with the apparent intentions of the Adams and Canter
courts. Thus, courts applying the rule to find that an officer is lia-
ble, or that officer liability is a question for the jury, have generally
premised their findings on evidence of the defendant officer's knowl-
edge of a risk of harm. 4 Two non-Louisiana cases in which the rule
was applied and officers were found not liable are also worth noting.
In the first, a federal court interpreting the standard held: "In the
absence of any knowledge, actual or constructive, of defects in [the
instrumentality which caused the injury, the defendant] had no
duty to investigate or to warn."55 In the second, the Iowa Supreme
Court, adopting the Canter rule, absolved an officer where a defect
which caused an injury was noticeable and reported to supervisors
other than the defendant officer prior to the accident.56 Apparently,
the Iowa court felt that even this evidence was insufficient to hold
the officer liable absent additional evidence that the noticeable de-
fect had been reported to him personally.
As will be seen, a distinctly different approach was taken by the
court in Schaefer, and by at least one other court which followed
the Canter rule citing Schaefer as authority.57
52. Id. at 559.
53. Dieter v. Hand, 214 Neb. 257, 333 N.W.2d 772 (1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 70-76.
54. Vega v. Southern Scrap Material Co., 517 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1975); Pease v. Zazza,
295 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa 1980); Brigdon v. Brandrup, 267 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1978).
55. Gates Rubber Co. v. Comeaux, 455 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 (W.D.La. 1978).
56. Kerrigan v. Erret, 256 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa 1977).
57. See supra note 53.
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II. THE SCHAEFER HOLDING
A. Action of the Schaefer Court
In 1978, an Ohio Court of Appeals adopted the Canter rule and
applied it to the facts in Schaefer. In Schaefer the brakes on a
truck owned by D & J Produce failed resulting in the death of a
third party motorist. The court held that officer liability under
those facts was a question for the jury. 8 The Schaefer opinion con-
tains no reference to any evidence that the two officers named by
the plaintiff knew of the truck's defects prior to the accident, nor
does the opinion refer to any evidence that the defendant officers
engaged in a course of conduct that would have made them aware
of a risk of harm. It is thus apparent that the Schaefer court
adopted the Canter standard and applied it to a fact pattern analo-
gous to those in Pisciotta and Simmons, 9 without citing those two
cases or acknowledging the dissents which they occasioned, and
without recognizing that those cases are inconsistent with the intent
of the Canter court.
As a result of its distortion of the Canter rule, the Schaefer court
has opened the door to vicarious liability of corporate officers. The
Canter rule provides that in order to be liable an officer must have a
personal duty to the injured third party.60 For present purposes,
that duty must by definition be one delegated by the corporation.
An officer who has a duty which has been delegated to him by his
corporation has two possible courses of action. He may either per-
form or fail to perform the duty, or, he may further delegate it to a
responsible subordinate. If the duty is delegated, and the test as in-
terpreted by the Canter and Adams courts is applied, the officer may
only be held liable where there is evidence that he knew or that in
the execution of his normal routine he would have known of a risk
of harm.6 Any other result would mean that the duty is non-dele-
gable. The importance of the requirement that the officer have
knowledge is that it rekindles the duty in the officer. In other
words, a duty, once delegated, cannot be the basis of an officer's
liability. He should only be subject to liability if he knew of a risk
of harm, or if his asserted lack of knowledge is implausible.
As to the delegation of the duty, the officer should be judged by
the same standard as the corporation. Thus, if the corporation can
58. Schaefer, 62 Ohio App. 2d at 62, 403 N.E.2d at 1021.
59. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
60. Schaefer, 62 Ohio App. 2d at 61, 403 N.E.2d at 1021.
61. See supra text following note 37.
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be said to have delegated the duty to the officer solely on evidence
that such is the usual procedure with respect to a particular duty,
an officer should be allowed to demonstrate delegation to a respon-
sible subordinate on the same basis. Once delegation to a responsi-
ble subordinate is established, the level of knowledge required by
the Canter court must be demonstrated. If it is not, an officer would
have no duty, and his liability, if any, would be purely vicarious.
Another flaw in the Schaefer court's wholesale adoption of the
Canter rule is its failure to appreciate that the rule was formulated
to address victims who were subordinate employees of the officers
being sued.62 Only seven of the Louisiana cases in which the Canter
rule has been applied involve suits by plaintiffs who were not corpo-
rate employees,63 and only one involves a suit by an individual with
no prior relationship to the corporate employer of the officer being
sued.64
An example will help clarify the significance of this point.
Suppose A, an employee of the XYZ Corporation, negligently in-
jures B, an individual who has a prior relationship with the XYZ
Corporation (say as an employee or a customer). B does not have
to argue that the XYZ Corporation is vicariously liable for his in-
jury since the prior relationship between XYZ and B gives rise to a
direct duty on the part of XYZ to exercise reasonable care toward
62. See supra note 23. The cases leading to the Canter decision also involved suits by
injured employees. See Saucier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 280 So. 2d 584, (La.
Ct. App. 1973); Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So. 2d 627 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Adams v. Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. Ct. App. 1958). In 1976 the Louisiana
worker's compensation statute was amended to provide that worker's compensation was an
injured employee's sole remedy against, "his employer, or any principal or any officer, direc-
tor, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal." LA. REV. STAT ANN.
§ 23:1032 (West 1985) (as amended by 1976 La. Acts No. 147, § 1). However, the 1976
amendment was held non-retroactive. See Green v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 351 So. 2d 366,
370 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978). Therefore, several suits by
employees whose injuries pre-dated the amendment were filed after 1976. See, eg., Pisciotta
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1979); Barcelona v. Highway Express Inc., 372 So.
2d 612 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Nine v. Harper, 371 So. 2d 320 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
63. H. B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975); Miller v. Upjohn
Co., 468 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Scariano Bros. v. Hammond Const., 428 So. 2d 564
(La. Ct. App. 1983); Ryals v. Home Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 827 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Freeman v.
Bell, 366 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Willis v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct.
App. 1977); Cain v. Witco Chemical Corp., 341 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
64. Ryals v. Home Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 827, 828 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (child with no prior
relationship to an oil company, injured while playing on a company oil well; individual of-
ficers named as defendants held not negligent).
65. The importance of this distinction is also noted by Professor Sykes in his most recent
article, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employ-
ment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 598, 605 (1988).
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B. If, on the other hand, the injured party B has no prior relation-
ship to XYZ, XYZ's liability, if any, cannot be based on a common
law duty of care since none exists. Absence of such a duty on the
part of the corporation clearly places this second fact pattern
outside the scope of the Canter standard, which requires as its first
tenet that the corporation owe a duty of care to the injured third
party. In other words, the Canter standard does not contemplate
that liability arising vicariously at the corporate level can serve as a
basis for liability of a corporate officer.
In Schaefer the court identified a statutory duty of the corpora-
tion to maintain brakes and horns, 66 and apparently assumed the
Canter rule could address whether it had been delegated and
breached, even though the rule had never before been applied to
hold an officer liable for an injury to an individual who had no prior
relationship to the corporation.
By failing to emphasize the importance of the defendant officer's
knowledge of a risk of harm and by applying the Canter rule to a
case involving a victim with no prior relationship to the corpora-
tion, the Schaefer court significantly altered the scope of the rule it
purports to adopt.
B. Proliferation of the Schaefer Rule
Although the language of the rule in Schaefer is identical to that
in Canter, the foregoing analysis indicates that the import of the
rule was altered by the Schaefer court. Disturbingly, the adoption
of the rule by the Ohio court has accorded it a prominence it did
not enjoy in the years of its application in Louisiana. For example,
the four part rule now appears in American Jurisprudence, which
cites Schaefer, and not Canter, as its source.67 As previously noted,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska has also adopted the four part stan-
dard citing Schaefer as its source, and the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, while not explicitly adopting the standard, has also cited
Schaefer.68 The danger of the proliferation of the Canter rule cited
under the authority of Schaefer is that the very sensible limitations
66. Schaefer, 62 Ohio App. 2d at 62, 403 N.E.2d at 1021.
67. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1878 (1985). But see 3A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1137 n.29 (pern. ed. 1986) (citing
Canter as the source of the rule). There is a traditional reluctance to rely on Louisiana prece-
dent because of its civil law roots. Conceivably courts are according the Canter standard
greater respect now that Ohio has adopted it.
68. Frances T. v. Village Green Owner's Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 456 (1986); Dieter v. Hand, 214 Neb. 257, 333 N.W.2d 772 (1983).
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placed on officer liability in the applications of the rule in the Canter
and Adams cases may be lost.
Although some courts which have adopted the four part stan-
dard from Schaefer have maintained the distinction intended by the
Canter and Adams courts,69 the Nebraska Supreme Court in Dieter
v. Hand,70 adopted the rule to reinstate a dismissed action against
an officer whose ability to have known of a risk of harm was even
more remote than that of the officers in Schaefer.71 Dieter was in-
jured when a frayed and sagging transmission wire came into con-
tact with his parked delivery truck.72 By the time Dieter brought
suit the statute of limitations against the company had run,73 so in
spite of the fact that Dieter had no prior relationship with the com-
pany, he sued both its local manager and its district manager.74
Although the complaint contained no information to support the
allegations that the defendants knew, or in the exercise of their nor-
mal routine would have known, of the condition of the transmission
line, the court held that under Schaefer the complaint was sufficient
to state a cause of action." A dissent succinctly stated the problem
with this ruling: "In my opinion the facts alleged in the amended
petition were not sufficient to establish a duty owed to the plaintiffs
by the defendants."76 If the defendants had no duty to the injured
plaintiff then their liability, if any, would be purely vicarious and
should be tested by the same policies that support vicarious liability
of corporations.
III. SHOULD CORPORATE OFFICERS BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE?
If corporate officers could be held vicariously liable as a result of
the vague language in the Canter rule and the extreme application
of that rule in Schaefer, an inquiry into whether they should be held
vicariously liable is required. That is, do the policies that support
69. Both the California Supreme Court (Frances T. v. Village Green Owner's Ass'n, 42
Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986)) and an Ohio Court of Appeals (Bowes
v. Riverfront Coliseum, 12 Ohio App. 3d. 12, 465 N.E.2d. 904 (1983)) have applied the
standard and found officers liable only on a showing that the officers did have prior knowl-
edge of a risk of harm.
70. 214 Neb. 257, 333 N.W.2d 772 (1983).
71. Id. at 262, 333 N.W.2d at 775.
72. Id. at 258, 333 N.W.2d at 773.
73. Id. at 260, 333 N.W.2d at 774.
74. Id. at 259, 333 N.W.2d at 773.
75. Id. at 263, 333 N.W.2d at 775.
76. Id. at 264, 333 N.W.2d at 776.
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vicarious liability of corporations also support vicarious liability of
individuals?
A. Policies Supporting Vicarious Liability of Corporations
A rule of vicarious liability allows an individual who has been
injured as a result of the negligence of a corporate employee to seek
judgment against the corporation without demonstrating that the
corporation had a duty to the injured victim and without demon-
strating that the corporation was in any way at fault for the victim's
injuries." Although some early scholarship suggested that vicarious
liability might be justified simply because corporations tend to have
"deeper pockets" than employee tortfeasors, recent scholarship has
focused on three separate but related economic bases for vicarious
liability. Thus current inquiry into whether a particular defendant
should be held vicariously liable focuses on whether that defendant
is best situated first, to prevent accidents,78 second, to bear the cost
of accidents, 79 and third, to promote an optimal allocation of pro-
ductive resources by being forced to bear the costs associated with
accidents.8 0
In a 1984 Yale Law Journal article," Professor Alan Sykes took
this analysis one step further, arguing that vicarious liability of cor-
porations will only achieve optimal allocation of resources if the
cost of preventing harm plus the cost of shifting liability from the
corporate employee tortfeasor to the corporation, are in total lower
77. See supra note I and accompanying text.
78. See, eg., Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584,
588 (1929). Douglas discusses prevention as part of his larger inquiry into whether distinc-
tions made between frolic and detour and those made between independent contractors and
servants are consistent with four risk administration goals: avoidance, prevention, shifting
and distribution.
79. See, eg., Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 460 (1923) ("IT]he
employer should be made responsible for injuries caused others by his employees, not merely
because the employer is better able to pay, but because he is in a better position than the
employee to effectuate the spreading and distribution of the loss.").
80. See, eg., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE LJ. 499, 514 (1961) ("Not charging an enterprise with a cost which arises from [its
operation] leads to an understatement of the true cost of producing its goods; the result is that
people purchase more of those goods than they would want if their true cost were reflected in
[the] price.").
81. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984). See also
Sykes, supra note 65 (summarizing the analysis in his 1984 article and applying it to scope of
employment cases, including cases seeking to hold motor vehicle owners for the torts of non-
owner drivers, cases seeking to hold premises owners for the torts of intruders, and cases
seeking to hold corporate employers for sexual harassment of subordinate employees by su-
pervisory employees).
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than the cost of the harm itself.82
Sykes reasons that if a corporation and its employees or agents
determine that it is less costly (more efficient) for the corporation to
bear the risk of civil judgments, they could be expected to enter into
a private contract placing the risk of liability with the corporation
rather than with the employee tortfeasor, rendering a rule of vicari-
ous liability redundant.8 3 In other words, assuming the corporation
is the better risk bearer, it would voluntarily assume the risk of civil
judgments because it is more profitable for it to do so.
Sykes further reasons, as have many earlier commentators, that
the corporation is almost always the better risk bearer.84 With re-
gard to prevention costs, the corporation should, by virtue of econo-
mies of scale, have less expensive means of prevention available to it
than does its employee." Furthermore, the corporation is better
situated to appreciate the overall pattern of risk it faces, both as a
result of its more extensive historical perspective and as a result of
its ability to view the entire organization and not merely a discrete
part.8 6 Thus, the corporation faces less uncertainty in investing in
prevention measures.87 Furthermore, even an employee who appre-
ciates that some harm will certainly occur is far more likely than
the corporation to adopt the attitude that it will be caused by the
negligence of employees other than himself.88 Finally, assuming the
corporation has a higher net worth than its employee, a given pre-
vention cost will be relatively more expensive for the employee than
it is for the corporation.89
The argument that cost spreading is best borne by the corpora-
tion is based on the fact that the corporation has a greater range of
choices as to how to spread the risk. A corporation can raise prices
to consumers, lower wages to employees, or lower returns to share-
holders.9" Although it may be argued that an employee can also
82. Sykes, supra note 81, at 1246. Sykes refers to this desired effect as a downward shift
in the social marginal cost curve.
83. Id. at 1236.
84. Id. ("[P]rincipals are often better suited than their agents to bear the risk of financial
losses.").
85. See id. at 1246 & n.46 (Sykes uses the terminology "more efficient loss avoidance
measures.").
86. Calabresi, supra note 80, at 543
87. See Sykes, supra note 81, at 1236.
88. Calabresi, supra note 80, at 543 ("[N]o single employee deems the risk of injury
arising out of his employment to be great enough to justify him either in insuring or in asking
substantially higher wages because of it.").
89. Sykes, supra note 81, at 1235.
90. See Douglas, supra note 78, at 592-93:
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spread costs by demanding higher wages and forcing the cost up to
the corporate level where it is easily spread, this argument depends
on the ability of the employee to appreciate the risk in the first
place. As previously noted, however, the corporation is in a better
position to appreciate corporate risks.91 In addition, a corporation
is in a better position to spread costs by insuring against harm, both
because it can better identify the harm to be insured against and
because it can acquire insurance more cheaply than its employees. 92
Indeed, a corporation may choose to self-insure, thereby avoiding
administrative costs and thus increasing its profitability. 93
In concluding that a corporation is a more efficient bearer of the
risk of civil judgments, and that corporations and their employees
can be expected to place this risk with the corporation as a matter
of private contract, Sykes argues that this private contract may nev-
ertheless fail to materialize in two situations. The first is where the
employee is insolvent or prone to insolvency.94 In that situation,
absent a rule of vicarious liability, the employee and the corporation
may have an incentive to leave the risk of civil judgments with the
insolvent employee, resulting in a lower possible recovery for any
victim.95 An additional result would be that the total cost of cor-
porate products will be artificially low because the price would not
include the true cost of preventing or compensating for accidents.
This would create an inefficient result because the artificially low
production cost would create inflated profits which in turn would
cause the corporation to attract capital which otherwise would flow
to those firms whose profits reflect all of their costs. 9 6
The second barrier to the proper allocation of risks via a private
contract arises when the transaction costs of privately distributing
The loss would be passed on to the consumer of the product or, more realistically,
the owner would recoup his loss or build up a reserve to handle it one of two ways:
(1) by increasing the price of the commodity sold so that there would be an in-
creased profit; or, if that were undesireable, (2) by decreasing costs so as to get a
greater differential between cost and price.
See also Calabresi, supra note 80, at 543-44 ("The cost of insurance is normally allocated in
part to the cost of labor, and thereby spread backwards. It is [also] in part spread forward to
consumers, through adjustments of price and output."); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liabil-
ity, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 127 (1916) ("[Elventually the cost [of the risk] will be paid by the
community in the form of increased prices.").
91. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
92. Calabresi, supra note 80, at 543.
93. Sykes, supra note 81, at 1236 n.18.
94. Id. at 1241-42.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1244.
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the risks between the employee and the corporation are high.97 In
that situation, absent a rule of vicarious liability, the corporation
may decline to enter into into a private contract, thereby leaving the
risk of civil liability with the employee. 98 While it is true that a
rule of vicarious liability will prevent the corporation from avoiding
these transaction costs, another problem arises. If the corporation
assumes the risk of liability, it will need to fashion some alternative
incentive for the employee to do his job carefully, since in the ab-
sence of the risk of a civil judgment the employee may become care-
less.99 If it is very costly for the corporation to do this, then
vicarious liability will have succeeded in transferring the total cost
from one party to another, but it will not have succeeded in lower-
ing the total cost. Sykes argues, however, that if behavior can easily
be monitored, an alternative incentive procedure can be fashioned
economically.' 00 Thus, he concludes that if transaction costs are
the problem, a rule of vicarious liability will only enhance efficiency
if the employee's behavior can be easily monitored.' '
Summarizing, vicarious liability will only contribute to eco-
nomic efficiency when it prevents the corporation from exploiting
weaknesses in the system of private contracting. Therefore, if an
employee's behavior is not easily monitored, or if circumstances do
not justify the assumption that the employee tends to be insolvent,
adoption of a rule of vicarious liability will be futile, and, worse yet,
wasteful of productive resources.
B. Vicarious Liability of Corporate Officers Does Not Promote
The Recognized Policy Objectives of Vicarious Liability
Neither of the opportunities to exploit the system of private con-
tracting which justify the adoption of a rule of vicarious liability for
corporations is present with respect to most corporate officers. Typ-
ically officers of corporations will have no reason to enter into pri-
vate contracts with their subordinate employees. If a vicariously
liable corporation is unable to satisfy a tort judgment and the victim
turns to the officer for compensation,10 ' absent a rule of vicarious
liability for officers, this failure to have contracted will mean that
97. Id. at 124243. Transaction costs in this context mean the costs of executing and
enforcing a private contract.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1236-39.
100. Id. at 1238. Sykes uses the terminology "cheaply observable."
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
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the risk of civil judgments will be left with the employee tortfeasor
or with the victim himself. This result can only be considered unde-
sirable if two things can be demonstrated. First, that the risk
should have fallen on the officer in the first place (that is, that of-
ficers are better situated to prevent accidents or to spread the cost of
accidents than their subordinate employees). Second, if it can fur-
ther be demonstrated that failure of the parties to place the risk
with the officer was due to the officer's desire to exploit weaknesses
in the system of private contracting.
Unlike corporations, officers are only marginally better situated
to prevent harm than their subordinate employees. 103 Officers are
individuals who do not enjoy the economies of scale which allow
corporations to prevent harm more cheaply. And, many officers,
particularly junior officers, will lack the requisite historical perspec-
tive and organizational overview to efficiently assess risk. More-
over, an officer may be just as likely as a subordinate employee to
feel that while harm may occur, it will be caused by someone else's
negligence. In addition, if the officer sought to be held liable is very
close on the corporate ladder to the negligent subordinate em-
ployee, it is not reasonable to assume that the officer's ability to
appreciate risks will differ significantly from that of the subordinate
employee. Similarly, while it is true that an officer may have a
higher net worth than his subordinate employee, many of the super-
visors who have been named defendants under the Canter/Schaefer
rule have been so close on the corporate ladder to the injured co-
employees, that it is unreasonable to assume that their respective
salaries and net worths are significantly different."°
The vast majority of officers also have more in common with
their subordinate employees than with the corporation regarding
ability to spread costs. Officers and supervisors whose duties are
limited to particular corporate divisions do not have the ability to
set prices, make blanket salary adjustments or control profit distri-
butions. Furthermore, most officers are not in a position to acquire
103. See Kraakman, supra note 7, at 864 (senior officers are inefficient risk bearers); id. at
865 (because senior officers are undiversified risk bearers, imposition of liability upon them
will cause them to demand high risk premiums in the form of increased compensation,
thereby decreasing economic efficiency). But see id. at 871 (arguing that senior managers are
more knowledgeable than subordinate corporate employees about corporate risks).
104. See, eg., Esco v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1985) (superintendent and assistant
superintendent sued for injury sustained by carpenter while he was a passenger in a cherry
picker operated by his foreman); Brown v. White, 430 So. 2d 16 (La. 1982) (maintenance
foreman sued for injury to a mechanic); Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982)
(foreman sued for injury to a forklift operator).
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private insurance as cheaply as corporations, and virtually none are
in a position to self-insure. However, it must be conceded that very
senior officers are better able to influence price, salary and profit
distribution decisions than most subordinate employees. In addi-
tion, very senior officers are sometimes better able to accomplish
cost spreading via insurance, as a result of the insurance and/or
indemnification provisions that may be part of their employment
agreements.
Nevertheless, even senior officers lack the one characteristic of
corporations that makes corporations willing to assume risks. This
is the ability of the corporation to benefit from the increased return
that may accompany the risk-taking. An officer whose salary is
fixed is not in a position to reap these benefits. 10 5
The foregoing analysis indicates that most officers are in no bet-
ter position than their subordinate employees to prevent harm, to
spread costs, or to assume risks. However, even if it is conceded
that officers are better risk bearers, they do not have the same moti-
vations as corporations to exploit the weaknesses in the private con-
tracting process. If a subordinate employee is insolvent, an officer,
unlike a corporation, cannot share in the increased return to the
corporation that would result from deliberately leaving the risk of
civil judgments with the insolvent subordinate employee." 6
If transaction costs are high, an officer, like a corporation, may
seek to avoid them by not entering into a private contract. How-
ever, as previously discussed, the adoption of a rule of vicarious
liability to compel the officer to assume the risk of civil judgments
will only be efficient if the officer can economically fashion an alter-
native incentive to induce the subordinate employee to use due care.
Since a corporation can only observe through its agents, the officer's
ability to observe the subordinate employee's behavior should paral-
lel that of the corporation. However, while the ability of corpora-
tion and officers to physically observe the subordinate employee's
behavior should be the same, it has already been argued that some
officers may not fully appreciate the risks which face the corpora-
tion. Furthermore, a cost of monitoring the subordinate employee's
behavior which the corporation may view as affordable, may be pro-
hibitive for the officer. Thus in terms of net worth, most officers
105. Of course, officers whose compensation is tied to corporate performance will share in
increased profitability. However, it is unlikely that this share of the increase in corporate
earnings would ever be sufficient to dissuade an officer who would otherwise have contracted
with his subordinate employees from doing so.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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will have more in common with their subordinate employees than
they will with the corporation.
Since it is not clear that officers are efficient risk bearers, and
because even if they are, they lack the incentives that corporations
have to avoid private contractual allocation of risk, vicarious liabil-
ity of corporate officers cannot be justified. Nevertheless, some
courts and commentators have argued that various corporate par-
ticipants should be held liable for acts which are not their own.
These arguments will be considered next.
IV. RECENT ARGUMENTS THAT CORPORATE PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS
Arguments that corporate participants should be liable for the
acts of others have arisen in several different contexts. Criminal
liability of corporate officers for the acts of their corporation has
been asserted under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act,10 7 under stat-
utes requiring corporations to furnish their employees with a safe
workplace,108 and under statutes addressing the disposal of hazard-
ous wastes.10 9 While some of the scholarship which followed these
cases questioned or deplored the apparent willingness of the courts
to hold officers vicariously or strictly liable, 1 there is ample evi-
107. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 1, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See, eg.,
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (corporate president fined for violation of the Act
of which he was aware); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). For a history of
criminal liability of corporate executives under the Act, see O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal
Criminal Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, The Dotterweich Doc-
trine, 30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 5 (1975). For a fuller discussion of the Park decision, see
Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officials for Strict Liability Offenses-A Comment on
United States v. Park, 28 UCLA L. REv. 463 (1981); Sethi & Katz, The Expanding Scope of
Personal Criminal Liability of Corporate Executives-Some Implications of United States v.
Park, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 544 (1977).
108. For a discussion of recent cases charging corporate officers with homicide for failing
to maintain a safe workplace, see Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate Officers, 71 A.B.A. J. 48
(Nov. 1985); McCormack, The Tightening White Collar: Expanding Theories of Criminal
Liability For Corporate Executives, Directors, and Attorneys, 49 TEx. B.J. 494 (1986). See
also, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option for Enforc-
ing Workplace Safety?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 183 (1986) (addressing the use and effective-
ness of criminal sanctions in federal statutes and state homicide laws in providing a safer
work environment).
109. For a discussion of cases holding officers liable under these statutes, see Note, En-
couraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous
Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986). See also Comment, Corporate Officer Liability for Hazard-
ous Waste Disposal: What Are the Consequences?, 38 MERCER L. REv. 677 (1987).
110. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-An-
other View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1982); Posner, Optimal Sentences for White Collar
Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409 (1980).
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dence in most of the cases of the sort of prior knowledge on the part
of the officer that was required by the Canter and Adams courts to
justify the decisions without reference to vicarious liability.111
If, however, the courts should attempt to hold an officer crimi-
nally liable on a purely vicarious basis, the same objections that
were raised to a rule of vicarious liability of officers in the civil area
would apply.112 In addition, if the object of a criminal penalty is
punishment, it is unlikely that vicarious liability of even an enter-
prise is justified in many criminal cases. 113
Several recent articles have questioned the economic efficiency
of limited liability for corporate shareholders, and have placed cor-
porate participants including owners, directors, officers and corpo-
rate advisors squarely in their sights as target defendants. 114 While
these articles are predominantly concerned with liability arising as a
result of financial transactions with corporate suppliers, customers,
or creditors, 115 some also briefly address liability to tort victims,
including those with no prior relationship to the corporation.16
In his 1984 article, Professor Reinier Kraakman considers cases
in which corporate officers are themselves the negligent tortfeasors,
and argues that the result of pervasive insurance and indemnifica-
tion procedures for corporate managers is a de facto system of en-
terprise alone liability, rather than dual liability of managers and
enterprises." 7  Kraakman argues that manager liability may en-
hance economic efficiency in three situations: first, where a firm is
unable to meet tort judgments, second, where effective sanctions for
excessive firm risk-taking are not available, and third, where em-
111. See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 664 (defendant admitted receiving notification of unsani-
tary conditions in the warehouse).
112. See supra Part III B.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 provides additional conditions which the
plaintiff must demonstrate in order to receive an award of punitive damages from a vicari-
ously liable enterprise. Since criminal penalties are essentially punitive in nature, these same
conditions should apply in criminal cases.
114. See, e.g., Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability For Negligence, 1972
DUKE L. J. 895; Downs, Piercing the Corporate Veil-Do Corporations Provide Limited Per-
sonal Liability?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 174 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and
The Corporation, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 89 (1985); Halpern, Trebilcock, & Turnbull, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980);
Kraakman, supra note 7; Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of
Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
115. Most of the literature refers to these as "voluntary creditors."
116. Most of the literature refers to these as "involuntary creditors." See supra text fol-
lowing note 65 (discussing the significance of the victim's prior relationship to the
corporation).
117. Kraakman, supra note 7, at 858-62.
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ployee negligence is difficult to detect. 18 Although Kraakman does
not purport to address liability of managers for the negligence of
others, he suggests that this issue is really indistinguishable from the
issue of managerial liability for the manager's own negligence.1 19 In
other words, Kraakman seems to argue that because in some con-
texts it may be economically efficient to require managers to provide
personally for their own tortious behavior, it will also be economi-
cally efficient for them to provide personally for the tortious behav-
ior of others. The arguments raised in the previous section of this
note refute this assertion.12
0
Similarly, other commentators who have considered the wisdom
of limited liability for corporate participants and who have weighed
the economic efficiency of managerial liability have not specifically
addressed the economic impact of holding officers responsible for
the acts of others.1
21
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE SCHAEFER STANDARD
Two separate conclusions emerge from the analysis here. The
first conclusion is that if a court wishes to begin with the assump-
tion that officers should not be held vicariously liable, then the
Schaefer standard should not be applied since it is too vague and
ambiguous to prevent a finding of officer liability which is purely
vicarious. To resolve this problem, it must be clear that the officer
sought to be held liable had a duty to the plaintiff. As was previ-
ously argued, this duty should only be deemed present if it can be
shown that the officer was responsible for a given enterprise activity
and that the officer either knew of a risk of harm associated with the
activity or was in such a position that it would have been implausi-
ble that he did not know of a risk of harm. This is consistent with
the distinction made by the Adams court between officers who
walked by the precarious stack of steel and officers who did not.'22
In order to ensure that this distinction is made by the courts, the
language "personally should know" must be removed from the
118. Id. at 867-68.
119. Id. at 890 ("Elevating [the manager's] supervisory function to a legal duty enforced
by personal liability would be useful only if enterprise liability alone failed to induce adequate
supervision. If so, however, the question of when to impose such an expanded duty on man-
agers would merely be a special case of the broader question of when to impose absolute liability
on managers at all" (emphasis added)).
120. See supra Part III B.
121. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 114, at 107-08; Halpern, Trebilcock &
Turnbull, supra note 114, at 145-47.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37
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standard, and replaced with language that is consistent with the dis-
tinction. For example, part four of the standard could read: 4)[h]e
is not himself personally at fault and liable for the negligent per-
formance of this responsibility unless the officer personally knows
or in the exercise of his normal routine certainly must have known of
its non-performance or malperformance and has nevertheless failed
to cure the risk of harm. 123 In order to ensure that this condition of
knowledge has been met, it must be considered a prerequisite to
liability. A court should not be allowed to let a case go to the jury
on the issue of whether there was a delegation of a duty unless the
plaintiff has established aprimafacie case of the level of knowledge
described in the proposed standard.
The second conclusion is that if a court wishes to begin with the
assumption that officers might be vicariously liable, then the court
must analyze the particular facts of the case in light of the ratio-
nales which support vicarious liability. This Note has argued that
in most cases such an analysis will result in the conclusion that vica-
rious liability is not justified. Thus, the main thrust of this Note has
been to suggest that if vicarious liability is to be applied, it should be
applied intentionally and with full analysis, and not inadvertently as
the result of an ambiguous standard.
CONCLUSION
The standard for corporate officer liability which was recently
adopted by an Ohio court of appeals was applied in a manner incon-
sistent with the intention of the court in which the standard was
originally formulated. Application of the standard in the manner
suggested by the Ohio court may permit a corporate officer to be
held vicariously liable. In most cases, such a holding is unjustified
by the policy rationales that support vicarious liability, and there-
fore the Ohio standard should be revised.
CHRISTINE W. BOOTH
123. Compare supra text accompanying note 17 (original standard stated in Canter) with
changes proposed here.
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